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Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner’s Illusion of Conscious Will1
Abstract: Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these
feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by
unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific
results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the
evidence.  Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it
is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any
interesting features of conscious will.  Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points
to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency.
In his 2002 book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, Daniel Wegner argues that
numerous neuroscientific results provide evidence that our feelings of conscious will are
illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is
rather entirely governed by unconscious neural processes.  He develops an alternative
explanation of feelings of will as inferences we make between occurrent thoughts and
behavior that happens to match the thoughts.  Wegner’s argument is based primarily on
two sorts of neuroscientific findings: (i) Libet’s work on the timing of mental events, and
(ii) the existence of separate neural pathways for the processes involved in the production
of action and in the conscious feelings of will.  In this paper, I will argue that Wegner
misuses both these kinds of evidence, by making two fallacious causal assumptions.
Each of these assumptions, when made explicit, involves a Cartesian disembodiment2 of
conscious will.  By Cartesian, I mean the idea that mental processes are not physically
instantiated in neural processes, that conscious experience is sufficiently separate from
physical processes as to stand in causal relations to them as distinct nodes.  It is this
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2disembodiment that leads Wegner to the conclusion that the will cannot be causally
efficacious. As I will demonstrate, the neuroscientific evidence, properly understood,
supports no such conclusion. However, there is also a more general lesson to be drawn
from this: Wegner’s fallacies serve as an indicator of the kind of care that must be taken
when reasoning about the causal structure of agency.
I begin by explicating the basic features of Wegner’s position, and how he uses
the Libet-derived ordering of events and the separation of neural pathways to support his
conclusion.  In section 2, I expose the causal mistake involved in Wegner’s use of Libet’s
results; section 3 looks at the causal mistake involved in the separate pathways argument.
In section 4, I argue that both of these causal mistakes lead Wegner to an unintended
Cartesianism, via the misrepresentation of nodes and relationships in the causal structure
of agency.  My concluding remarks generalize this case to several take-away points.
I.
Two distinctions are crucial to Daniel Wegner’s position.  The first differentiates
between what he calls the empirical will and the phenomenological will.3  There is no
question that humans do things: pick up coffee cups, drive cars, walk, blink.  Wegner
attributes these manifestations of will, observed actions, to the empirical will.  We need
not be conscious of performing these actions; Wegner claims that we are generally aware
of only a small subset of our actions.  We blink without realizing it, we walk without
thinking, and we even can drive home on “autopilot.”  It is crucial to note how Wegner is
using the term “action.”  Many would disagree that these examples are manifestations of
will, insofar as some of them are reflexive or automatic.  This is part of the point Wegner
wants to make: the empirical will is what is responsible for all activities, by definition.
The empirical will is operationally defined as what accounts for behavior, conscious or
not.  Opting for a wider use of the term than most of the philosophical literature, Wegner
includes in the class of actions what is normally termed activity or mere behavior.4
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In contrast to outputs of usually unconscious behavior generated by the empirical
will, Wegner sets the phenomenological will.  This is the conscious aspect of will: it
includes both our intentions to act, and the “feelings of oomph” we have as we act.
When we are willing to report “I did that,” we are reporting feelings of phenomenological
will.  Of all the behavior that is attributed to the empirical will, only a small subset
involves phenomenological will.  While the empirical will has demonstrable behavioral
results – blinking, driving – Wegner claims that the phenomenological will cannot simply
be assumed to have a demonstrable effect on our behavior (BBS 652).  In order to find
out whether or not our conscious experience of will has any causal influence on behavior,
he argues that we must first clarify what is meant by the word “will,” and then look to the
empirical results of science to see if this kind of will is causally influential.  So far, so
good.
To make this clarification, Wegner introduces the second distinction mentioned
above: the word “will” can have two meanings, says Wegner, and each must be evaluated
separately as to its potential impact on action.  The first sense of the word is will as a
feeling.  This feeling is what we have as we do something: imagine wanting coffee and
reaching out to pick up your cup.  There is a feeling of doing, of motion being initiated
and guided by the conscious subject, which accompanies the action.  According to
Wegner, it is this feeling of doing that marks actions as our own, rather than another
person’s.
The second sense of the word is will as causal force of the mind – not the
experience of acting, but the causal impact this experience may (or may not) have on
actions.  This aspect, the will as causal force, connects what the mind has decided to do
with the bodily motions needed to do it.  Wegner holds that this way of construing the
will’s causal impact – of the mind making the body do its bidding – is inappropriate.
While we cannot doubt that we have the experience of acting, Wegner cautions us against
4assuming that we also experience the causal force.  In a vaguely Humean vein,5 he says
we have no evidence for this causal force other than the experience – we never actually
see the will causing our actions. “As soon as we accept the idea that the will should be
understood as an experience of the person who acts, we come to realize that conscious
will is not inherent in action – there are actions that have it and actions that do not.” (BBS
651)  We have no grounds for positing an unknown connection that mysteriously turns
our mental intentions into bodily movements; what we have grounds for accepting is
what we experience, and we experience will only as a feeling that accompanies action.6
After arguing that the feeling, not the force, is the appropriate sense of the word
“will,” Wegner claims it is empirically and conceptually unable to give conscious will
causal efficacy.  The genuine causal efficacy of agency is grounded in unconscious neural
processes, not in conscious experience.  As regards the feeling of doing – the “oomph,”
as he refers to it – he employs a quasi-Humean conceptual analysis of causation to
demonstrate that a feeling cannot be a cause or a force – the two meanings of “will”
cannot overlap.  “Causation is an event” (ICW 13), Wegner explains, not a property.
Will is a feeling, and feelings cannot be causal because they would have to have
causation as a property in order to do so.  Therefore, our experience of will cannot be a
cause of anything.  Instead, we can infer from the constant conjunction of feelings of will
with actions that the will causes the actions, but this inference can never be substantiated.
“In the same sense, causation cannot be a property of a person’s conscious intention.
You can’t see your conscious intention causing an action, but can only infer this from the
regular relation between intention and action.” (BBS 652)
This is a quasi-Humean position, rather than straightforwardly Humean, because
Wegner does hold that there is a genuine causal sequence leading up to actions. The
constant conjunction of intention and action is only part of the perceived, not the real,
causal sequence of actions.  He draws an analogy to a magic trick: the audience is led to
believe in a particular causal sequence that results in a rabbit being pulled out of the hat.
It looks so simple that we think there could not be any other explanation.  But in reality,
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5there is another hidden causal sequence, which is both much more complicated than the
perceived one, and is genuinely causal – the perceived sequence is spurious.  Similarly
for agency: the perceived causal sequence is of our mental intentions causing bodily
actions, but this is a mistaken inference based on the constant conjunction of felt will and
action.  There is a real causal sequence that leads to action, but it is hidden from the view
of consciousness.
This leads Wegner to posit his Theory of Apparent Mental Causation: “people
experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their
action.  This means that people experience conscious will quite independently of any
actual causal connection between their thoughts and actions.” (BBS 654)  He posits three
conditions that, when they are met, result in the experience of felt will:  (i) priority in
time of our thoughts of doing something to the occurrence of action thought about; (ii)
the consistency of our prior thoughts with the action that occurs; and (iii) the exclusivity
of other known causes of that action.  Consider the example of picking up a coffee cup:
the thought, “gee, I’d like some coffee,” must occur before the actual picking up of the
cup; it must be consistent in the sense that the coffee cup is the object picked up; and
there must be no other obvious causes of the cup being picked up, such as another person
lifting it.  If these conditions are met, we experience the action of picking up the cup as
consciously willed by ourselves, and as caused by our conscious willing, even though,
according to Wegner, that experience is the result of a spurious inference and we are
entirely unaware of the genuine causal path leading to the lifting of the cup.
While Wegner’s book utilizes a large assortment of results from psychology and
neuroscience, I will focus on two particular kinds of evidence he interprets in favor of the
theory of apparent mental causation.  The first is the findings of Benjamin Libet about
how subjects experience action and decision in time.  The second is the use of double
dissociations between experiences of will and actual behavior or action to indicate
separate processing pathways for action and conscious will.  These form the primary
evidentiary basis for his claim that the feeling of will is illusory.
Libet’s 1985 paper, “Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will
in voluntary action,” sparked a heated discussion both of the role that the will plays in
6action, and of the interpretation of the results and the methodology employed to arrive at
them.7  In Libet’s experiments, subjects were instructed to lift their finger
“spontaneously, with no preplanning,” at some random point during the course of one
timed minute.  The subjects were instructed to note the time at which they felt the urge or
decided to lift their finger,8 by noting the position of a rotating disc on a clock face.
Readiness potentials are measured at the scalp, and are an overall measure of neuronal
activity.  These potentials are known to ramp up, or increase, just before action is
initiated.  Libet recorded the subjects’ readiness potentials, and compared these to their
reports of when decisions were made, with adjustments for reaction time.
What Libet found is that readiness potentials began ramping up in preparation for
movement consistently about 200-500 milliseconds before subjects reported the urge to
move their fingers, as if the brain was already preparing for motion before the decision to
move had been made. Libet took this to mean that the conscious initiative which subjects
introspected was not causally efficacious in their movement, since the movement was
already initiated by neurons before the decision or urge to move was reported.  Libet
ultimately concluded that we do not consciously initiate action.
Wegner focuses on this negative aspect of the experiments: our decision to move
lacks causal efficacy in the initiation of movement. Either the decision causes the
preparation for movement, or it doesn’t.  If it doesn’t, then the preparation for movement
either causes the decision or is independent of it.  In this linear causal structure, the
decision could not have affected the earlier preparation.
The next kind of evidence offered by Wegner concerns the mechanisms
responsible for phenomenological and empirical will. Wegner takes us on a supposed
search for a localized area of the experience of conscious will, to see how it might
compare to the localized areas involved in generating action.  Where in the brain does the
experience of conscious will arise, he asks, and is it causally involved in the production
of action?  It is not sufficient to know what part of the brain lights up in scanners when a
subject is engaged in voluntary actions, he says, because this indicates only the areas of
causal sequences underwriting action, and “this sort of evidence tells us little about where
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7the experience of will might arise” (31).  The guiding idea here is that there may be one
set of neural mechanisms that allow us to perform voluntary actions, and a different set of
mechanisms that leads to the experience associated with these actions.  Wegner looks at
ear-wiggling, phantom limbs, and brain stimulation, among other results, while
investigating voluntary action, finding that “the experience of will may not be very firmly
connected to the processes that produce action, in that whatever creates the concept of
will may function in a way that is only loosely coupled with the mechanisms that yield
agency itself” (47).  Wegner speaks of looking for the will in terms of looking for a
“lightbulb” that flashes in accompaniment to voluntary action.  When the lightbulb
flashes, subjects report actions as consciously willed.  He concludes this chapter by
saying that no such thing has yet been found, and is unlikely ever to be found (60).
Instead, the brain “shows evidence that the motor structures underlying action are distinct
from the structures that allows the experience of will.  The experience of will may be
manufactured by the interconnected operation of multiple brain systems, and these do not
seem to be the same as the systems that yield action” (49).  The separateness of neural
systems for action and experience of will, along with their timing, are taken to be
sufficient evidence of the causal impotence of consciousness: “A microanalysis of the
time interval before and after action indicates that consciousness pops in and out of the
picture and doesn’t really seem to do anything” (59).
From these two pieces of evidence, Libet’s measurements of readiness potentials
and the separateness of neural pathways, Wegner establishes his positive claim about
Apparent Causation.  In the next two sections, I will separately examine each of these
evidentiary items to see if they do in fact support his conclusion.
II.
The first major causal mistake in Wegner’s reasoning is pointed out by Marc van
Duijn and Sacha Bem (2005) in, “On the Alleged Illusion of Conscious Will” (VDB
henceforth).  They explicate the mistake and then present their own positive account of
how to understand agency.  I will not address their positive account, but instead expand
on their criticism.
8 van Duijn and Bem do an excellent job of cutting straight to the heart of the
problem with the way Wegner uses Libet’s work.  Essentially, Wegner confuses
causation with constituency. Intentions don’t cause neural processes; they are neural
processes.  This is a category mistake: “saying that neuronal activity causes conscious
will is therefore very much like saying that H2O molecules cause water.” (VDB 707)
There is something dubiously Cartesian about treating mental intentions as
separate from and able to stand in certain causal relations to neural processes: what might
such incorporeal intentions be, if they do not involve neural processes?  Wegner speaks
of intentions as distinct from neural processes, and of the mind as distinct from the brain
(BBS 665).  This is not merely a matter of conceptual distinctness, but of separate causal
entities.  Wegner’s picture is one where intentions either cause the neural processes that
lead to action, or else are causally disconnected from these processes.  In light of Libet’s
results, Wegner thinks the latter is the only scientifically respectable answer.  However,
as van Duijn and Bem show, once we remind ourselves that intentions are physically
instantiated, that they are constituted by neural processes, then Libet’s results are
innocuous.  It is not possible to discriminate with readiness potentials between neuronal
activity that constitutes decision making, of which the subject’s report is the conclusion,
and the neuronal activity that constitutes preparation for movement.  Wegner committed
a mistake by expecting to find a causal relationship in a relationship of constituency.
Although van Duijn and Bem don’t emphasize this point, their criticism highlights
a fundamentally Cartesian assumption underlying Wegner’s use of Libet’s results.  While
Cartesianism is not expressly endorsed by Wegner, in this particular case it arises out of
an oversimplification of causal structure.  The way Wegner parses causal variables and
asks how they stand to one another renders the two variables distinct from one another.
Conceiving of intentions and neural processes as distinct entities that could stand in
causal relations to each other requires them not to overlap, as they would with
constituency, and is the result of using a linear causal model: either the intentions come
first, or the neural processes come first.  By failing to capture the complexity of the
constituency involved –  that intentions are instantiated in the brain precisely as neuronal
activity – Wegner lacks the means to model a hierarchical causal structure and ends up
9with a conclusion, the causal inefficacy of conscious will, that is an artifact of the
representation of results within an oversimplified causal structure.
III.
While van Duijn and Bem accurately diagnose the problem with Wegner’s use of
Libet’s experiments, their criticism does not address his point about the separateness of
neural pathways for experience of will and for action.  The constituency-not-causality
criticism doesn’t apply to a dissociation between separate pathways: there could not be
such an identity relation between them because the entire point is that they are different.
Instead, I will show, by looking at other instances of separate pathways in neuroscience,
that such separation need not lead to the conclusion that one pathway lacks causal
efficacy, or fails to causally influence the other pathway.  The evidence simply does not
license such an inference.  We need not be forced to either attribute complete causal
control to conscious experiences of will, or else write it off as an illusion.   This
dichotomy, necessary to reach Wegner’s conclusions, is based on another oversimplified
causal assumption: that what conscious will is supposed to affect is the other pathway,
the unconscious neural processes involved in action.  This again involves an implicit
treatment of conscious will as lacking physical instantiation in neural processes, what
I’ve labeled his untended Cartesianism.
An excellent counterexample is the pathways involved in object recognition and
spatial recognition, both part of the visual system.  Separate cortical pathways for object
vision and spatial vision were demonstrated by Mishkin, Underleider, and Macko (1983,
MUM henceforth).  Visual perception has at least two cortical pathways: the ventral
stream for recognizing objects; and the dorsal stream for recognizing spatial relationships
and locations (MUM 414).  Lesions in the dorsal and ventral area in monkeys and
humans indicate double dissociation between the two streams.  Object agnosia, for
instance, results from a lesion to the ventral stream: patients have intact visual sensory
abilities, and are able to individuate objects, but cannot recognize what they are, nor use
them as a guide in behavior (such as finding food using a previously-seen object as a
guide; see Banich 2004, p. 225).  Lesions in the dorsal stream do not affect object
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recognition, but lead to disorders such as topographic disorientation.  Patients are unable
to find routes around in their environment, and may, for instance, be unable to find thei
way back to their hospital room.  They recognize objects, but lack the ability to use
spatial location cues (Banich, 242).  This separation of neural pathways, their task
specializations, and their mutual contribution to vision and visually-informed action, are
well-established.
The dorsal and ventral streams of vision are by no means the only such examples,
as separate pathways are ubiquitous in the brain.  Most importantly, such examples are
not taken to indicate that either one pathway is illusory or causally ineffective, or that
these pathways do not causally interact in the production of behavior.  The range of
interesting questions brought up by the dorsal and ventral streams of vision include the
following: at what point do these streams separate?; where and how are they reintegrated
to yield a unified sense of vision?; what kinds of tasks rely primarily on one stream rather
than another?; and what happens when conflicting information is available to the
different streams?  Wegner does not ask any of these questions about agency.  He
concludes it must be epiphenomenal.
A primary reason for Wegner’s case that conscious will is not causally efficacious
in agency is the separation of pathways generating action and generating the feeling of
will.  Precisely the same kind of separation occurs in the case of dorsal and ventral
streams of vision.   This provides no reason to think that object recognition is either
illusory, or causally unconnected to spatial recognition. What it does mean is that there
must be a more complex causal relationship between the two than identity.  Similarly, the
evidence does not support Wegner’s claim that experience of will, because it utilizes
different pathways or neural structures than action initiation, must be either illusory or
causally unconnected to action generation.  The evidence radically underdetermines this
conclusion.  That the experience of will and the generation of behavior are not identical
should not be news to anyone.
Hiding beneath Wegner’s emphasis on the separateness of pathways is an
assumption that if conscious will were to be causally efficacious, it would have to be
causally efficacious on the other pathway, on the separate and unconscious structures
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involved in producing actions.9  This, I argue, is a fundamental misunderstanding of what
conscious will is supposed to accomplish.  Conscious will is not supposed to causally
influence the other unconscious causes involved in action production.  The component
effect of conscious will on action is simply not directed at the other unconscious
components of action.  Rather, the component effects of conscious will are directed
outward at the world; the unconscious components are also directed outwards, not intra-
system to the other components.  Just as the dorsal stream’s causal role is not to
determine how the ventral stream does its work, the causal role of conscious will should
not be understood as determining how another pathway for behavior generation works.
The two work in conjunction to produce a combined result; conscious will is not
supposed to work by consciously affecting neural activity.
IV.
I conclude with a more general overview of the dualistic causal assumptions
needed to conclude that.  Let us re-examine a point from section 1.  Wegner’s argument
has the following structure: the will should be understood as a feeling; causes are events,
not properties (of feelings); and therefore feelings (of will) cannot be causes.  This may
be a clever way of formulating the problem, but the analysis invokes an unnecessary and
unwarranted Cartesian assumption, the implicit premise that feelings cannot be events.
This premise is true only if feelings are not physically instantiated.  Neural events can be
causes.  Only if feelings are completely incorporeal, having no neural activity associated
with them in any fashion, would it be acceptable to say that feelings cannot be events,
and so cannot serve as causes.  Wegner’s conceptual analysis attempts to demonstrate a
breach between experience and behavior by assuming the nonphysicality of experience.
It is no surprise that, with such an assumption, one will have difficulties relating
experience back to the physical actions of the body – this is the quintessentially Cartesian
dilemma, and a large part of why one wants to avoid Cartesianism in the first place.  The
conclusion only follows, though, if we allow the implicit disembodiment of conscious
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features of agency.  If we disallow this treatment of anything conscious as incorporeal,
the conclusion of epiphenomenality cannot be drawn from the evidence.
This leads to take-away point 1: Node Choice Matters.  The way in which causal
variables are individuated, to be subsequently investigated as to their causal relations, has
physical significance.  Which nodes are chosen will determine to a largely unappreciated
extent the results one finds.
This disembodiment is also at work in Wegner’s use of Libet’s results.  No one
disputes that there is a ramp-up of neuronal activity just prior to the conscious decision
being reported.  However, this would support the conclusion of the inefficacy of the
decision only when conjoined with an assumption that none of the observed increase in
neuronal activity is due to decisionmaking.  One would have to assume that the
decisionmaking, which led to the reported decision to lift a finger, was neurally
unobservable, and that none of the observed increase in neuronal activity was involved in
any conscious experience.  These two quite dubious assumptions exemplify the physical
significance of node choice, in take-away point 1.  Treating the conscious decision as
separate from, and standing in causal relations to, the neuronal activity surrounding it in
time is to disembody the decision.
Finally, let us take another look at the claim that the existence of separate neural
pathways must render one pathway causally ineffective. Wegner supposes that if
conscious will is to have causal efficacy, it must causally affect some other pathway
directly, specifically, the unconscious pathway involved in action production.  But the
causal power of agency belongs to the entire system, which includes both conscious and
unconscious aspects; and the causal efficacy of the system is directed out towards the
world, toward tasks like lifting coffeecups.  The causal relationships between the dorsal
and ventral streams of vision do not themselves constitute vision.  Similarly, the causal
relationships between the neural processes of conscious will and neural mechanisms of
behavior generation do not constitute will.  This is take-home point 2: Point your Causal
Arrows in a Safe Direction.  In this context, that means not at each other.
Take-away point 2 also applies to using an oversimplified causal representation.
A linear model of causation, where there is a single chain of causes in a row, will fail to
capture the intriguing causal relations seen with separate pathways (not to mention
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constituency).  A well-established phenomenon like the dorsal and ventral streams of
vision cannot be effectively modeled in this way. There is no reason to think pathways
involved in will and action would fare any better under this treatment.
It is reasonable to assume that Wegner did not intend to make Cartesian
assumptions about his subject matter.  His book has the tone of “going back to the
science” to fix the unjustified assumptions of philosophy.  So how did he end up with
such a Cartesian position?  His problems are artifacts of the causal representations he
used, of putting a multi-level, complex causal system into a linear, single-level
representation.  The simplifying assumptions required to fit the extraordinarily complex
nexus of conscious and unconscious neural processes into such a model ended up
severing the intimate connections between action and experience.  An appearance of
causal inefficacy is a function of a poor representation of the causal relationships
involved, not a genuine feature of conscious will.  The treatment of conscious will and
neural processes as distinct causal entities already carries with it a Cartesian
disembodiment of the conscious will.  I take it for granted that Cartesian disembodiment
is not a desiderata of a good account of agency, scientific or philosophical.  In order to
avoid such disembodiment, due care must be taken to preserve structural complexities in
causal representation per take-away points 1 and 2.
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